Disinformation is an Information Environment Problem

The piece was originally drafted for an expert working group at the invitation of INDSR (Taiwan) and DKI-APCSS in May 2022. You can find further information from a similar piece by K.S. Park.

Understanding the Information Environment

“Big‑tech” companies and internet platforms dominate the information space today. As we dive into communities, we discover that how people consume media online—and why they trust a particular source—is not well understood in the region. This knowledge gap hinders stakeholders who aim to support various phases of crisis response.

A woman in her 30s carrying a baby might have to rely solely on a short‑video platform to navigate an evacuation plan—something the platform’s designers never anticipated, as we observed during the Ukraine war (2022). During the COVID‑19 pandemic, even more communities depended on the internet for virtually every aspect of daily life. How the pandemic reshaped the information landscape remains understudied.

We argue that “orienting” local social norms to strengthen communication resilience against disinformation must consider three pillars: law, technology architecture, and market forces specific to each country’s information environment. This daunting task exceeds the capacity of any single stakeholder. While the online sphere is not the sole information channel, it poses a particular threat to situational awareness for policymakers, responders, and on‑the‑ground operators—both for short‑term response planning and long‑term stability. Rapidly grasping the critical dimensions that empower a given information environment (by territory or demographic) would complement existing intervention frameworks used by experienced benevolent actors.

The information space also rests on pre‑existing layers that keep the TCP/IP internet operable at all levels. What appears irrelevant at the “physical” layer (e.g., submarine cables for island territories) can be disrupted by a single incident, effectively cutting a region off from the global information ecosystem. A ban on an IP‑address block from a dominant platform could leave tens of thousands of innocent citizens even more vulnerable to internal manipulation. Stakeholders who keep the internet alive are rarely included in public discourse on disinformation, yet—as we never imagined a global pandemic would strike in the 21st century, a kinetic conflict can also occur. All relevant parties must be engaged in this security field to protect local communities.

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Disaster, Information Vacuums, Disinformation, and the Looping Cycle

When an event erupts in a remote location, we often have zero reliable information, while affected people scramble for whatever sources are at hand. Information supply reaches its nadir precisely when demand for accurate data spikes dramatically. This imbalance creates a vacuum that adversaries can exploit to launch harmful information campaigns.

During prolonged crises such as COVID‑19 or the war in Ukraine, a series of events resembles recurring tides and waves. Targeted exploitation of the information vacuum gradually becomes normalized, reinforcing a harmful feedback loop. Once a sizable portion of a population settles into this “trap,” it becomes exceedingly difficult for any intervention to reduce risk and save lives.

If information supply and demand are designed without addressing these vacuums—or, put another way, without mitigating windows of opportunity—the resulting lack of local resilience turns communities into victims at every stage of response. That vulnerability is then repeatedly exploited in subsequent cycles.

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Rethinking Capacity‑Building Mechanisms

People drawn into hostile information spaces often lack self‑awareness of their situation. Information is critical to all facets of life, yet acting under the sway of disinformation can become a “perennial illness,” worsening security problems throughout a crisis. Preparedness is a long‑term investment, and concepts from public‑health capacity building can inspire novel ways to bolster local resilience against disinformation. For example, public‑health and social measures aimed at protecting preschoolers, teenagers, or retirees must differ because each group varies in mental and physical readiness.

The current global information environment favors direct exploitation by malign actors via large platforms. Individuals frequently feel overwhelmed by the flood of information. To empower them to become resilient in hostile environments, we should lower barriers to producing locally relevant information. When people can create and share content pertinent to their immediate surroundings, they are less likely to become nodes that amplify disinformation. Investing in tools that enable the creation of a community‑centric information ecosystem is especially valuable when external connections are severed—whether due to power outages or loss of internet connectivity.