零日攻擊之混合/電磁場景

背景：2025年，A國在總統就職520前夕，加強對B國外島進行併吞行動的軍演

A國在2022年和2024年對B國的大規模軍事演習，從模擬對B國進行封鎖和進攻，展示軍事實力，威懾B國及其支持者的傳統威脅型態之外，在2024年年初的演習持續時間更長，涉及更多兵力和裝備，並加強了網路戰和電子戰等非傳統戰鬥領域的訓練。

2025年A國在520總統就職一週年前夕，持續針對B國挑起國際輿論的矛盾。在華盛頓特區的專家中廣泛流傳著新任美國總統就職後「B國疑美論」的敘事，並且針對外島進行高度混合和電磁戰的廣域干擾。

劇本一：電子戰干擾和威脅

A國國防部宣布將在幾天內進行定期軍事演習，演習將持續超過兩週，大規模動態部署跨戰區指揮的部隊。A國的海軍艦艇和大型民用滾裝船集結在F省N市附近的港口，開始進行虛擬海上封鎖。

B國北部海域的 GPS 訊號遭致干擾，B國的民用船舶必須切換回傳統導航。A國進一步指定B國及與那國島、石垣島和宮古島上空為禁飛區 (NOTAMs)。B國譴責A國方面的封鎖行為，並請求日本和美國提供僑民緊急應變的資源支持。大量射頻器材透過人道救援協作管道，輸送到B國各僑民和相關組織。

劇本二：針對本島外島的混合戰演練

由於無法採取具體的反制措施，A國對B國外島的軍演壓力可能會升級為武裝入侵。與此同時，朝鮮向日本海發射彈道導彈，使東亞局勢更加緊張。北京再度加強對B國通信和金融基礎設施的網路攻擊，台北政府因此尋求來自日本和美國的網路安全協助，並請求提供包括衛星在內的通信工具。

LINE 作為民生通訊最為廣泛使用的網路服務，其 DNS 被大幅攻擊造成癱瘓。LINE 母公司宣布暫時停止針對B國使用者提供通訊服務至少48小時，訊務量恢復到正常水平的時間不明。不明封包阻斷式攻擊，也影響到網路域名的正常解析。由於部分根域名伺服器 (root server) 在B國無 Anycast DNS 服務，因此許多 .com 網址的國內外網站服務，也面臨不等障礙。

*本文件的目的僅為教育使用

Hybrid/Electromagnetic Scenario of Zero-Day Attacks

[Situation Summary]

Background: In 2025, on the eve of the presidential inauguration on May 20th, Country A escalated its military exercises aimed at annexing the outlying islands of Country B.

In 2022 and 2024, Country A conducted large-scale military exercises against Country B, simulating blockades and assaults to demonstrate military strength and intimidate Country B and its supporters. Unlike the traditional forms of threats, the exercises at the beginning of 2024 were longer in duration, involved more troops and equipment, and included enhanced training in unconventional warfare areas such as cyber warfare and electronic warfare.

In 2025, on the eve of the inauguration week of Country A’s president on May 20th, Country A continued to provoke international public opinion tensions against Country B. Among experts in Washington, D.C., narratives of “Country B’s suspicion of the U.S." have been widely circulated following the inauguration of the new U.S. president, accompanied by widespread hybrid and electromagnetic warfare disruptions targeting the outlying islands.

Scenario 1: Electronic Warfare Interference and Threats

Country A’s Ministry of Defense announced that it would conduct regular military exercises within a few days, lasting over two weeks, with large-scale dynamic deployments of cross-theater command troops. Country A’s naval vessels and large civilian roll-on/roll-off ships gathered at ports near Ningde City in Fujian Province to begin a simulated maritime blockade.

GPS signals in the northern waters of Country B were disrupted, forcing civilian vessels to switch back to traditional navigation methods. Country A further designated the airspace over Country B and the Yonaguni, Ishigaki, and Miyako Islands as no-fly zones (NOTAMs). Country B condemned Country A’s blockade actions and requested emergency resources from Japan and the United States to support its expatriates. A large number of radio frequency equipment was transported through humanitarian cooperation channels to expatriates and related organizations in Country B.

Scenario 2: Hybrid Warfare Exercises Against Mainland and Outlying Islands

Unable to take specific countermeasures, the pressure from Country A’s military exercises on Country B’s outlying islands could escalate into armed invasion. Meanwhile, North Korea launched ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, further intensifying the situation in East Asia. Beijing reinforced cyber attacks on Country B’s communication and financial infrastructure, prompting the Taipei government to seek cybersecurity assistance from Japan and the United States, including requests for communication tools such as satellites.

LINE, the most widely used internet service for civilian communication, experienced a major DNS attack, causing paralysis. The parent company of LINE announced a temporary suspension of communication services for users in Country B for at least 48 hours, with the timeline for restoring normal service unknown. Unknown packet blocking attacks also affected the normal resolution of internet domain names. Due to the lack of Anycast DNS services for some root servers in Country B, many domestic and international websites with .com domains faced varying degrees of service disruption.

*Document is for educational purpose only

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腳本：TH

聯絡：ths@duck.com

部分參考：https://www.spf.org/japan-us-alliance-study/en/global-data/user17/20240328112121392.pdf