Taiwan’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, Part Two

This is the English version of the original article.

As always, I remain deeply concerned about the operations of this committee. However, after the initial meeting, I have gained more insights and would like to share my current observations.

Committee’s Objectives and Member Expectations

The committee’s objectives were established from the outset, and members and advisors are expected to accomplish specific “missions." There’s little room for deviation or “free play."

Civilian Training Programs

In terms of “civilian training," the programs presented are well-established, with quantifiable metrics that facilitate reporting and management. For instance, the “Disaster Relief Volunteer (DRV)" program, which had previously received lukewarm attention, falls into this category. These programs are relatively flexible, with “lightweight" and “modular" training requirements that anyone can grasp within a few hours. However, practical implementation is a different matter, as it involves command and control (C2) dynamics that cannot be achieved through individual efforts alone. Among the 40,000 certified Disaster Relief Volunteers, the actual mobilization rate in any situation might be low. Those groups with higher mobilization rates may already hold other disaster prevention and relief roles, necessitating more nuanced analysis.

Although the DRV program is labeled as training or certification, it resembles more of an awareness or engagement program. The certificate is merely a piece of paper, and local administrative units have yet to tap into the potential utilization of these specialists.

Regional Disaster Prevention Collaboration Centers

Another initiative is the “Regional Disaster Prevention Collaboration Centers," heavily reliant on specific groups for adoption. This isn’t a recent development and also boasts significant metrics. I believe it’s necessary to analyze the current situation from a data-driven perspective.

National Security Council’s Remarks

The reported statements from the National Security Council (NSC) representative are intriguing.

The exercise results indicate that while establishing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) early can enhance response mechanisms, it’s essential to break away from conventional thinking to strengthen horizontal and vertical coordination and operational capabilities during emergencies. Additionally, most units tend to focus on single-event responses, lacking consideration for the interdependence and interconnectedness of resources across units. Future efforts should aim to improve response capabilities for complex threats. Moreover, communication mechanisms among central, local, and departmental entities in the face of large-scale and complex disasters need reinforcement. It’s crucial to contemplate how to establish systematic information communication channels between central and local authorities.

It’s peculiar that internal governmental issues are being discussed in a committee that includes external members. The NSC’s focus shouldn’t be on “systematic information communication channels," as this concept seems misaligned. The underlying assumption is a functional and robust central government. Given this, considerations should include:

• (a) The intensity of command and control?
• (b) The span of control?
• (c) Enhancing the resilience of information systems supporting command and control?
• (d) Recovery or alternatives when command and control nodes are compromised or inoperative?
• (e) Setting tolerance levels for effective span of control losses?

As for the “communication mechanisms" among the Executive Yuan, local governments, and ministries, I advise against using such committees for deliberation and research. This is a complex issue with challenging prioritization decisions. Additionally, coordination with allied government agencies is necessary, which I believe falls outside the scope of this committee’s design but is indeed a critical pain point that requires attention. The communication mechanisms between Taiwan, its foreign missions, and overseas community organizations concerning complex disasters are substantial topics to consider.

Corporate Engagement in Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience

The pathways for publicly listed companies or large enterprises to proactively “support," “assist," or “respond to" whole-of-society defense resilience are unclear and should not be overlooked.

From its inception, this committee has demonstrated a strong intent to conduct complex Tabletop Exercises (TTX) and drills. However, remember the ancient adage: “To execute without teaching is called cruelty."

That’s all for now. I just noticed a press conference is underway.