Zero-based Mobilization: A Rapid Assessment of the Recent Hualien Flood Disaster and the Modernization of Taiwan’s Mobilization Systems

The scale and intensity of civilian mobilization witnessed during this Hualien flood disaster are unprecedented in recent years’ mobilization efforts. Even the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, which is highly capable in mobilization, saw a completely different demographic of volunteers entering the disaster area through their volunteer system than the faces they are familiar with. In this precarious and increasingly competitive online era, we must adopt a “Zero-Based" concept to modernize mobilization work.

Two Disasters

We compare the Tainan 0706 Danas Typhoon Disaster and the Hualien 0923 Flood Disaster.

Nature and Scope of the Disaster: Typhoon Danas caused widespread strong winds and power outages in the northern districts of Tainan, resulting in immense damage to infrastructure (especially the collapse of utility poles). The Guangfu flood disaster, on the other hand, was caused by the overflow of a landslide-dammed lake, leading to the rapid inundation of the entire Guangfu downtown, resulting in trapped people and regional isolation. If we look at the total affected population, the difference is as high as 30 to 50 times.

Power Damage: The number of households affected by power outages caused by Typhoon Danas in Tainan (282,000 households) was far greater than in Hualien’s Guangfu (around 4,000 households, with over 1,800 affected), and the number of collapsed utility poles set a historical record, a microcosm of a nationwide disaster. Taipower’s engineering teams and contractors provided full support.

Telecommunications Interruption: The telecommunications disruption caused by Typhoon Danas lasted longer, with over a thousand damaged base stations, affecting a wide area, which was a serious warning sign of a complete infrastructure collapse. The total number of damaged base stations in Guangfu Township and adjacent affected areas was only a dozen or so. The difference between the two is nearly a hundredfold.

Water Supply: Tainan’s issue was primarily an indirect water shortage due to the power outage. In the Hualien Guangfu flood, the water supply system faced a complete shutdown due to the flood itself.

Some have questioned why the “spontaneous mobilization" during the Tainan wind disaster was not as effective as the disaster relief mobilization in Hualien’s Guangfu. So, from the perspective of non-traditional mobilization work, what conditions “facilitated" the emergence of Guangfu’s “Shovel Supermen" (volunteers with shovels)?

Conditions that Led to the Shovel Supermen 鏟子超人

The main conditions that enabled this “Zero-Based Mobilization" in Guangfu Township to cross the “historical threshold" of disaster volunteer mobilization are:

1. Completely different nature and scope of the disaster
2. Communications
3. Power (mainly rail transport-related)
4. Transportation
5. Political Atmosphere (not discussed in this article)
6. Specific internet platforms controlled by foreign capital

(1) is an act of nature; (2) to (4) are areas where the government and state-owned enterprises played an active role; (6) has absolutely no Taiwanese involvement. Let’s start with (2).

(2) is the most crucial condition. The reason is that the painful experience of the Tainan wind disaster led to “restoring communications in the disaster area" being placed as a very high priority during the Central Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) meetings convened for the Hualien flood. Several videos were circulated during the flood, including videos filmed by government personnel, which spread across the internet. These were widely quoted by the media on the same day. The next day, victims uploaded their own footage, and images of people moving into the disaster zone poured in continuously. The third day (9/25) marked the beginning of the historic explosion of civilian efforts.

Taiwan has a high density of telecom base stations, making it almost impossible for all of them to fail at once. As long as the telecommunications network maintained a certain level of operation, news and images from the disaster area had a chance to circulate immediately. If the disaster had been spread across multiple counties and cities, the outcome might have been very different.

(3) Power is important, but it primarily refers to the power for the Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA) operation, which is also linked to (4). On the morning of September 24, the day after the disaster, the TRA Guangfu Station resumed operation. Without this major artery to transport a large number of volunteers into the disaster area, things would not have developed to this extent. According to the TRA’s statement, the passenger flow numbers for Guangfu Station are as follows:

Date	Total Ins and Outs	Outs	Ins
9/24	1,009	540	469
9/25	2,253	1,240	1,013
9/26	5,715	3,040	2,675
9/27	35,000	17,800	17,200
9/28	41,000	20,000	21,000
9/29	46,690	22,410	24,280
9/30	21,151	11,114	10,037
10/1	35,012	17,151	17,861
10/2	38,655	18,942	19,713
10/3	33,600	16,450	17,210
10/4	51,240	25,654	25,586
10/5	45,963	22,263	23,700

Total Ins and Outs over 12 days: 357,288 people

Total Outs: 176,504 people

Total Ins: 180,744 people

These figures have already surpassed the total annual number of passengers entering, exiting, and total throughput for the previous year, indicating a significant surge in passenger flow at Guangfu Station during this period. Notably, the 51,240 passengers on 10/4 set a new historical high for the station, approximately 54 times its average daily passenger flow last year. The previous high of 46,690 on 9/29 was also exceeded on 10/4.

(6) is the internet platform, which is completely outside of Taiwanese control. This platform is generally believed to be Threads, one of Meta’s products, commonly known as “脆" in Taiwan. The power of Threads is undeniable, but if there were a remote disagreement within the platform regarding “boosting" or “suppressing" Taiwan’s online public opinion space, then the “Shovel Supermen" phenomenon, as addressed in President’s National Day Address this year, would have been unlikely to occur, and the rapid emergence of dozens of “information integration platforms" would also have been improbable.

Thinking on Zero-Based Mobilization

Zero-Based Mobilization is a planning approach that views every new mobilization effort as starting from scratch, rather than assuming past resources, processes, or allocations can be reused. The scope and nature of the damage caused by the Guangfu flood were virtually unprecedented for everyone. Past mobilization procedures also had to be revised due to the massive explosion of civilian efforts. Tzu Chi’s account is a good example: their volunteers’ average age is 60, but the average age of those registered through their volunteer system and assigned tasks in the disaster area was 29. Tzu Chi’s mobilization capability is top-notch, yet the overall proportion of all volunteer efforts distributed through the Tzu Chi system over the ten-plus days did not exceed 10%.

This is historically unprecedented for disasters in Hualien.

Principles of Zero-Based Mobilization

Based on the response experience from this flood disaster, we must consider the flexibility of various mobilization efforts for disaster response. The legacy frameworks seem inadequate, and it was “a good thing" that this disaster was confined to a small township. If more townships across Taiwan were unfortunately to face massive damage simultaneously, simply replicating the “solution pathway" from this response experience would likely prove ineffective.

• Starting from Zero — All deployable government assets, volunteer personnel needs, disaster relief budget items, and logistical support must be reassessed and their necessity re-justified, instead of directly utilizing existing arrangements.
• Demand-Driven Allocation — Resources should only be allocated after clear, quantifiable needs have been verified, avoiding inertia caused by historical legacies (such as ineffective exercises) that may crowd out the rationality of regular training resources.
• Cost-Effectiveness — By re-engineering the mobilization plan each time, redundancy can be identified, waste can be reduced, and newer, more efficient solutions can be adopted.
• Flexibility and Adaptability — Response plans should not be constrained by legacy structures, allowing for rapid adaptation to man-made or natural disasters, operational environments, changing threats, or strategic priorities.

Conclusion

Zero-Based Mobilization extends the rigor of zero-based budgeting to the entire mobilization process, ensuring that every investment is based on the current mission’s actual needs, cost-effectiveness, and high alignment with strategic objectives. This is the valuable public resource that Taiwan can retain after the “Shovel Supermen" phenomenon.