一口茶的時間。
剛在某郵件論壇裡，瞥見 Giuseppe Attardi [1] 在談傳統組織在網路治理的無效和不彰（例如台灣 NCC 或是其他主責機關）的問題，竟然會提到 Albert-László Barabási [2] 和 Elinor Ostrom [3]。前者是 network theory 的大腕，後者是2009年的諾貝爾經濟學獎得主，主要研究是公共財和公共 “Commons” 治理的政治歷史。Giuseppe 下面的這段話，很貼切說明了所謂「台灣網路失落的15年（編按：我不同意，但暫且引用）」遇到的是什麼問題：
- The state solution is subject to decision errors that will worsen the situation. If the imposition of rules fails, the devastation of the resource is almost granted, achieving the opposite effects from those expected. The “privatization and free market” solution leads to increasing prices of services and inefficiencies due to fragmentation, administrative costs and to risks of creating oligopolies that influence governments in order to bend the rules in their favor.
跳轉，無論是 TIEA 或是近日想要成立 Open Data 聯盟的 TCA，能否在網路公共財的治理上扮演好角色，我認為從作事的每一個環節就可以清晰判別。
- In these situations the social institution that manages the Commons does not have these disadvantages and is highly adaptable. The system is modeled on what Barabási describes as “small worlds linked through larger nodes.” Distribution of connectivity scalable according to the Power Law provides the right degree of adaptability and stability.
[1] http://www.di.unipi.it/~attardi/
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert-L%C3%A1szl%C3%B3_Barab%C3%A1si
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elinor_Ostrom
T.H. Schee 